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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
CONCRETE PRODUCTS COMPANY, a 
division of Gibbons & Reed, 
a corporation, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
-vs-
SALT LAKE COUNTY, a body 
politic, 
Defendant and Appellant 
No. 19771 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action to recover from Salt Lake County the value 
of concrete materials sold not to Salt Lake County but to David 
Pearce Construction, a subcontractor engaged by the owner-developer 
of the Larsen Estates Phase III subdivision, which materials were 
used in the curbs and gutters in said subdivision but which were 
not paid for by the subcontractor to whom they were sold. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The case was tried to the court without a jury with the 
Honorable Scott Daniels, District Judge, presiding. From a 
judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant-appellant seeks reversal of the judgment in 
plaintiff-respondent's favor as a matter of law. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The genesis of this case arises out of a residential sub-
division development in Salt Lake County. The owners-developers 
of the particular subdivision were not parties to the proceeding 
in the lower court nor are they parties to this appeal. The only 
parties both in the lower court proceeding and in this appeal are 
plaintiff now respondent, Concrete Products Company, a manufac-
turer and distributor of concrete products, and, defendant now 
appellant, Salt Lake County, the political entity of the State of 
Utah which approved the said subdivision (R. 81-82). 
Sometime prior to November 16, 1976, Clealon Mann, a land 
developer, submitted a linen plat for a proposed residential 
subdivision development at approximately 3835 South and 5780 West 
in Salt Lake County, Utah, to Salt Lake County for the approval of 
and subsequent recording of said subdivision plat with the County 
Recorder. The County, however, would not approve or permit the 
recording of the subdivision plat until the "developer" either 
installed at "developer's" expense certain required subdivision 
improvements, including curb and gutter, or in the alternative, 
made provision to guarantee the installation of the required 
subdivision improvements at "developer's" expense. 
The owner-developer of the said subdivision designated as 
Larsen Estates Phase III then did make provision to guarantee the 
installation of the required subdivision improvements within a 
period of two years by entering into an Agreement with Salt Lake 
County (copy at R. 4-7, R. 43-45 and R. 138-141) by which guar-
antee he assigned unto Salt Lake County his interest in an escrow 
account he had established with Western Mortgage Loan Association. 
This Agreement was made and entered into pursuant to the provi-
sions of Section 19-5-2 of the Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake 
County providing in pertinent part that: 
MIn lieu of the actual completion of the 
improvements...the subdivider may file with 
the county commission a surety or cash boncf, 
escrow agreement or letter of credit in an 
amount specified by the commission to assure 
actual construction of such improvements' 
within a two year period...." (Emphasis 
supplied). 
After the aforesaid guarantee was furnished by the devel-
oper, the Board of County Commissioners then, on January 19, 
1977, approved the proposed residential subdivision plat; and, 
that approved plat was thereafter recorded in the office of the 
Salt Lake County Recorder on January 20, 1977, as Entry No. 
2900210 in Book 77-1 at Page 12. The Owner's Dedication on said 
subdivision plat states in pertinent part: 
"...we, the undersigned owners of the above 
described tract of land, having caused same 
to be subdivided into lots and streets to be 
known as the 
LARSEN ESTATES, PHASE III 
do hereby dedicate to perpetual use of the 
public all parcels of land shown on the plat 
as intended for public use." 
The concrete materials for which plaintiff-respondent was 
awarded judgment in the lower court were furnished on or before 
May 11, 1979 and had a value of $1,637.09. (R. 132, R. 220). 
They were sold by plaintiff-respondent not to Salt Lake County 
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but to David Pearce Construction (R. 117, R. 129), a subcontractor 
who was engaged by the owner-developer of the Larsen Estates Phase 
III subdivision. They were used for curb and gutter on property 
dedicated for perpetual use of the public as set forth in the 
Owner's Dedication on the subdivision plat. The curb and gutter 
improvements were required by Salt Lake County as a condition for 
its final approval of said proposed subdivision (R. 129-130) 
pursuant to the express requirements of Section 19-5-1 of the 
Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake County, which provides in per-
tinent part as follows: 
MSec. 19-5-1. Required Improvements. 
No final plat of a subdivision of land shall 
be recorded, except as provided in subsection 
19-2-2, without receiving a statement signed 
by the county engineer certifying that the 
improvements described in the subdivider's 
plans and specifications have been completed, 
that they meet the minimum requirements of 
all ordinances of the county, that they 
comply with the following recommendations of 
the Salt Lake City-County board of health, 
the flood control division, the planning 
commission and the county fire department 
and, with the standards, rules and regula-
tions for subdivisions approved March 29, 
1959, July 14, 1961 and subsequent thereto, 
by the board of county commissioners, which 
standards, rules and regulations are hereby 
incorporated in this title by reference. 
(Emphasis supplied). 
* * * 
(3) Street Improvements. 
* * * 
(n) The subdivider shall install 
curbs, gutters and sidewalks on existing and 
proposed streets in all subdivisions, except 
on the rear of such lots as back on major 
streets not permitted access to such streets." 
(Emphasis supplied). 
* * * 
Salt Lake County never solicited, invited or received any 
bids to do any of the work or construction which would neces-
sarily have to be done in order for the developer to make the 
required subdivision improvements required by the County as a 
condition for its approval of the proposed subdivision. (R. 131). 
The thing the County did do with reference to its approval of 
said proposed subdivision was to have the developer guarantee 
that the required improvements in fact would be installed within 
a period of two years at the expense of the owner-developer. The 
developer did just that by signing the Agreement referred to 
above. (Copy of Agreement at R. 4-7, R. 43-45 and R. 138-141). 
The said Agreement was a performance bond or guarantee and not a 
payment bond which the County never did require. (R. 132). 
Plaintiff-respondent was not paid for the concrete materials 
by the subcontractor who ordered them and which were furnished 
for the curb and gutter improvement in the said Larsen Estates 
Phase III subdivision. Plaintiff-respondent first sued the 
subcontractor and later sued Salt Lake County for the value 
thereof for which it was awarded judgment (R. 220) against the 
County in the lower court. Its contention is that the perfor-
mance guarantee which the County insisted upon and received in 
the form of the Agreement hereinabove referred to was a "public 
contract" within the purview of Title 14, Chapter 1, U.C.A. 1953, 
then in effect (subsequently repealed by Laws of 1980, Ch. 75), 
and accordingly, since the County did not require a "payment" 
bond, the County thereby became liable to plaintiff-respondent 
for the concrete materials it furnished and which were used in 
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the curb and gutter improvements in the Larsen Estates Phase III 
subdivision. 
The crucial substantive issue for resolution by the Utah 
Supreme Court is: 
Did the governmental action taken by 
Salt Lake County in requiring the developer 
of the Larsen Estates Phase III subdivision 
to guarantee that he, at his expense, would 
install required improvements as a condition 
for County approval of said developer's 
proposed subdivision, constitute the awarding 
of a "public contract11 within the purview of 
Title 14, Chapter 1, U.C.A. 1953, which would 
require both a "performance" and a "payment" 
bond? 
Defendant-appellant respectfully submits that such govern-
mental action on the part of Salt Lake County does not constitute 
the awarding of a "public contract" within the purview of the 
aforesaid Utah Code provision. 
ARGUMENT 
Point 1. THE LOWER COURT ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT 
PLAINTIFF'S AMENDED COMPLAINT DID STATE 
A CLAIM AGAINST DEFENDANT UPON WHICH 
RELIEF COULD BE GRANTED. 
The claim asserted by Concrete Products Company against Salt 
Lake County in its Amended Complaint (R. 81-85) in essence is 
that the Agreement (copy at R. 4-7, R. 43-45 and R. 138-141) by 
which the owner-developer of the proposed Larsen Estates Phase 
III subdivision guaranteed unto Salt Lake County that he, at his 
expense, would install the improvements which the County required 
as a condition for its approval of said subdivision is in fact a 
"public contract" within the purview of Title 14, Chapter 1, 
U.C.A. 1953, which would require besides the "performance bond" 
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or guarantee which the County did require, in addition, a "pay-
mentff bond which the County did not require. Counsel for 
Concrete Products Company reiterated this same claim to the lower 
court at the trial when he argued: 
"...plaintiff did not get paid for these 
materials and so we have filed this lawsuit 
seeking recovery from the County under a 
specific statutory section set forth in Title 
14, Chapter 1 of the Utah Code !l (R. 246). 
The specific statutory provision referred to in the Amended 
Complaint and the argument of counsel is embodied in Section 
14-1-5 of the Utah Code which provides: 
"Before any contract for the construc-
tion, alteration, or repair of any public 
building or public work or improvement of... 
any county...is awarded to any person, he 
shall furnish to...such county...bonds which 
shall become binding upon the award of the 
contract to such person, who is hereinafter 
designated as 'contractor1: 
f(1) A performance bond...said bond shall 
be solely for the protection of the public 
body awarding the contract.1 
f(2) A payment bond...solely for the 
protection of persons supplying labor or 
materials to the contractor or his subcon-
tractors. . . . f" (Emphasis supplied). 
If the assertion being made that the mere requirement, under 
its police power, of a "performance11 bond or guarantee that 
required improvements be installed before a proposed subdivision 
development is approved by a political entity is in fact a 
"public contract" within the purview of the aforesaid Utah Code 
provision, it would be a chilling, devastating blow to all sub-
division development throughout the entire state. Furthermore, 
it would constitute an unwarranted and unwanted intrusion into 
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development and construction activities of all subdivision 
developers. Anytime a political entity required a "performance11 
bond to guarantee performance of requirements imposed on sub-
division developers for the health, safety and protection of the 
public, the developer would have to advertise for bids, let 
contracts for required subdivision improvements to the lowest 
responsible bidder, etc., etc., as is statutorily required for 
"public contracts". 
Assume momentarily that the developer didn't install the 
required subdivision improvements which he guaranteed he would 
install. Under this assumption he would have defaulted on his 
guarantee. Thereafter, the political entity would have looked to 
the "performance" bond or guarantee; and, the political entity 
thereafter would have advertised for bids as the Utah Code 
mandates and then awarded a contract to the lowest responsible 
bidder for the installation of the required subdivision improve-
ments. The award of a contract under such circumstances would 
constitute the awarding of a "public contract" within the purview 
of Title 14, Chapter 1, U.C.A. 1953, which would have required 
both a "performance" and a "payment" bond. The mere requirement, 
however, which Salt Lake County imposed on the developer of the 
proposed Larsen Estates Phase III subdivision, that he guarantee 
unto the County that the required subdivision improvements be 
installed before the County approved his proposed subdivision was 
not the awarding of a "public contract". An objective analysis 
of the actual Agreement entered into between the County and the 
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developer to guarantee performance by the developer of the 
requirements imposed on the developer as a condition for the 
approval of his proposed subdivision evidences that it is not a 
"public contract". 
The fact that Salt Lake County did not award a "public 
contract" within the purview of Title 14, Chapter 1, U.C.A. 1953, 
so as to make it liable to Concrete Products Company for not 
having required a "payment1' bond as well as a "performance" bond 
as a condition for the County's approval of the developer's 
proposed subdivision would be crystal clear and unchallengeable 
had the developer procured a "performance" bond issued by a 
professional bonding company such as United States Fidelity & 
Guaranty Co., which was one of the options of the developer under 
Section 19-5-2 of the County Ordinances. The County then would 
not even be a party to the performance guarantee which the County 
required the developer provide before it approved the developer's 
proposed subdivision. There in fact is no justifiable distinction 
between the performance guarantee which was provided and to which 
the County was a party, and, a performance guarantee which might 
have been provided by United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co. as 
above set forth. No "public contract" within the purview of 
Title 14, Chapter 1, U.C.A. 1953, was awarded by Salt Lake 
County. 
Objectively considering the foregoing analysis, the Amended 
Complaint simply doesn't state a claim against Salt Lake County 
upon which relief can be granted. 
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Point 2. THE LOWER COURT ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO 
RULE THAT PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS AGAINST 
DEFENDANT WERE BARRED BY THE MANDATORY 
PROVISIONS OF THE UTAH GOVERNMENTAL 
IMMUNITY ACT, TITLE 63, CHAPTER 30, 
U.C.A. 1953. 
Salt Lake County, as a political entity of the State of 
Utah, is immune from suit for the action it took in regulating 
the proposed Larsen Estates Phase III subdivision development, 
which action gave rise to the claims of Concrete Products 
Company. The Utah Governmental Immunity Act, at all times 
applicable to this case on appeal, provided in Section 63-30-3 
thereof that: 
"Except as may be otherwise provided in 
this act, all governmental entities shall be 
immune from suit for any injury which may 
result from the activities of said entities 
wherein said entity is engaged in the exer-
cise of a governmental function.'1 
The plain and simple fact is that, in this case, Salt Lake 
County did nothing more than exercise one of its "governmental 
functions" by regulating a proposed subdivision within its 
territorial limits under the "police power" delegated unto it by 
the Utah Legislature. Salt Lake County did not enter into a so-
called "public contract". Salt Lake County never at any time 
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tried to promote or develop the proposed subdivision. It never 
advertised for or sought bids for the improvements it required as 
a condition for its approval of said subdivision. Salt Lake 
County never awarded any contract "...for the construction, 
alteration or repair of any public building or public work or 
improvement of the...county...." There was never any privity of 
contract between Salt Lake County and the general contractor who 
was engaged by the owner-developer of the proposed subdivision to 
install the required improvements. 
The only thing Salt Lake County in fact did do was to exer-
cise the police power delegated unto it by the Utah Legislature 
to control and regulate subdivisions within its jurisdiction by 
requiring the developer, in lieu of completing the required 
subdivision improvements before it gave its final approval to the 
proposed subdivision, to guarantee that said improvements would 
be completed within a period of two years. The developer made 
this guarantee by the Agreement which was entered into with the 
County. (R. 4-7, R. 43-45 and R. 138-141). It's a warped, 
twisted and tortured interpretation of plain, unambiguous 
language to construe the developerfs guarantee set forth in that 
Agreement as a so-called "public contract" within the purview of 
Chapter 1 of Title 14, U.C.A. 1953, which would require not only 
a "performance11 bond but also a "payment11 bond. 
It is generally recognized that subdivision control, as a 
part of land use regulation, is an acceptable part of the police 
power reserved unto the states by the Tenth Amendment to the 
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United States Constitution. The Utah Legislature delegated 
authority unto the several counties to impose subdivision con-
trols on proposed subdivisions located within the unincorporated 
areas of the respective counties by the provisions of Title 17, 
Chapter 21, and the provisions of Title 57, Chapter 5, U.C.A. 
1953, as amended. Such controls, when established and enforced 
to conserve and promote the public health, safety, morals and 
general welfare of the community, are usually upheld as con-
stitutional over claims that the statutes violate due process 
through a deprivation of land. Mansfield and Swett, Inc. v. 
Town of West Orange, 129 N.J.L. 145, 198 A. 225. This court, in 
speaking of the subdivision control authority which the Utah 
Legislature delegated unto the political subdivisions of the 
state, said in Ellis v. Hale, 13 U.2d 279, 373 P.2d 382, at page 
384 of 373 P.2d: 
"...the laws here involved have as their 
object the intelligent and orderly develop-
ment of the community...." 
In the case of Seal v. Mapleton City, 598 P.2d 1346, this 
court held that Mapleton City was immune from a damage suit 
involving its action pertaining to a proposed subdivision within 
the city limits because such action was deemed a "governmental 
function". Also, in the case of Breitling Bros. Construction, 
Inc. v. Utah Golden Spikers, Inc. and the State of Utah, 597 P.2d 
869, this court said at page 871 of 597 P.2d: 
"...we can see no basis whatsoever upon which 
to agree with plaintiff's contention that it 
should be deemed that there was a contract 
with the state of Utah by which it was 
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obliged to require Golden Spikers to furnish 
a bond to guarantee payment of laborers and 
materialmen, as required by Sec. 14-1-5, 
U.C.A. 1953." 
As well as: 
"The important point to note is that the 
prerequisite to invoking the requirement of 
those statutes [14-1-5 and 14-1-7] is that a 
contract must be awarded." 
It should be noted that the Breitling Bros, case, although the 
contract being negotiated was never properly entered into, 
involved a situation where State officials were in fact nego-
tiating a contract for the removal of a race track at the Utah 
State Fairgrounds and the installation of a soccer field. Those 
negotiations pertained to an "entreprenurial venture" wherein 
revenue would be derived for and on behalf of the State. The 
situation involved in that case is in no way like the situation 
involved in the instant case. In the instant case, Salt Lake 
County was not engaging in an "entreprenurial enterprise" but, on 
the contrary, was merely exercising its delegated police power to 
regulate a proposed subdivision. 
The governmental activity engaged in by Salt Lake County in 
regulating the proposed Larsen Estates Phase III subdivision, is 
analogous to the governmental activity engaged in by the State of 
Utah in its regulation of a financial institution within the 
state, which activity, this court, in the case of Madsen v. 
Borthick, 658 P.2d 627, held enjoyed "governmental immunity". In 
the course of its opinion, this Court held, speaking through 
Justice Oaks, at page 631 of 658 P. 2d: 
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"...we conclude that governmental supervision 
of financial institutions is an activity fof 
such a unique nature that it can only be 
performed by a governmental agency....! 
Standford, 605 P. 2d 1237.!! 
"...the governmental activity in this case 
qualifies as a 'governmental functionf". 
In the instant case, the supervision and regulation of the 
proposed Larsen Estates Phase III subdivision by Salt Lake County 
was an activity of such a unique nature it could only be per-
formed by Salt Lake County under its delegated "police power", 
and accordingly, the action the County took by requiring a 
performance guarantee from the developer, qualifies as a !lgov-
ernmental function" enjoying "governmental immunity". 
Even assuming, arguendo, that the action which Salt Lake 
County took in regulating the proposed Larsen Estates Phase III 
subdivision was not a "governmental function" so as to make its 
said action "immune" from liability, the lower court still should 
have dismissed the Amended Complaint because of the failure of 
Concrete Products Company to have complied with another mandatory 
provision of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act; namely, Section 
63-30-11, U.C.A. 1953, as amended, which provided at all times 
applicable to the instant case in pertinent part that: 
"Any person having a claim...against a 
governmental entity...shall, before main-
taining an action under this act, file 
written notice of claim with such entity 
for appropriate relief....11 (Emphasis 
supplied). 
The record shows that the original Complaint was filed May 9, 
1980. (R. 2). However, the document which plaintiff-respondent 
contends was its "notice of claim" (R. 151) , although dated 
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May 9, 1980, was not in fact served on Salt Lake County until 
May 12, 1980 (R. 151-152), three (3) days after the filing of the 
Complaint. In other words, contrary to the mandate of the 
statute, the ,fnotice of claim" was given not before, but after, 
the filing of the Complaint. 
Finally, both claims set forth in the Amended Complaint 
should have been dismissed by the lower court because of the 
failure of Concrete Products Company to have complied with still 
another provision of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act; namely, 
Section 63-30-13, U.C.A. 1953, as amended, which provided at all 
times applicable to the instant case in pertinent part as follows: 
ffA claim against a political subdivision is 
barred unless notice of claim is filed with 
the governing body of the political sub-
division within one year after the cause of 
action arises." 
The record shows conclusively that the concrete materials 
for which Judgment (R. 220) was granted against Salt Lake County 
in favor of Concrete Products Company were furnished on or before 
May 11, 1979. (R. 82, R. 131-2 and R. 216). These materials 
were sold by Concrete Products Company not to Salt Lake County 
but to David Pearce Construction, a subcontractor engaged by the 
owner-developer of the Larsen Estates Phase III subdivision. 
(R. 117 and 132). Accordingly, any claim or possible claim which 
Concrete Products Company may have had against Salt Lake County 
for the value of those materials arose on or before May 11, 1980. 
However, the document which Concrete Products Company contends 
was its "notice of claim" (plaintiff's Exhibit F attached to the 
Pre-Trial Order - R. 151), although dated May 9, 1980, was not 
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served on Salt Lake County, as evidenced on the face thereof and 
by the Constable!s Return attached thereto, until May 12, 1980. 
(R. 151-2). The above referred to mandatory provision of the 
Utah Governmental Immunity Act was not complied with by Concrete 
Products Company. 
The lower court, in its Memorandum Decision of December 13, 
1983 (R. 189), and, based on its Conclusion of Law No. 14 signed 
February 3, 1984 (R. 219), concluded and ruled that it was not 
necessary to consider the "unjust enrichment11 claim which was 
asserted by plaintiff-respondent for the first time when it filed 
its Amended Complaint (R. 81-85) on July 6, 1983 (R. 81). This 
ruling was not appealed by plaintiff-respondent. However, 
plaintiff-respondent, in its "Statement of Points on Which 
Plaintiff-Respondent Intends to Rely on Appeal" (R. 234-5) 
asserts in Point III (R. 235) that: 
"The lower court erred by failing to deter-
mine that plaintiff is entitled to recover 
the value of its concrete materials delivered 
to Larsen Estates Subdivision for curb and 
gutter improvements, to prevent Salt Lake 
County from being unjustly enriched to the 
detriment of plaintiff." 
In view of this, defendant-appellant respectfully submits the 
following response. 
At the outset it is respectfully submitted that the owner-
developer of Larsen Estates Phase III subdivision may possibly 
have been "unjustly enriched" by the concrete materials which 
plaintiff-respondent furnished and which were used in the curbs 
and gutters in that subdivision, but, on the contrary, that Salt 
Lake County, as a political entity of the State of Utah, was not 
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"unjustly enriched11. The actual fact is that rather than having 
been "unjustly enriched," the contrary is true. This for the 
reason that by accepting the proposed subdivision which the 
owner-developer submitted to the County for approval, the County 
thereby and thereafter became obligated to maintain and service, 
for the benefit of the public, the said curbs and gutters; and *"" 
likewise, the County thereby and thereafter became exposed to 
possible liability claims for damages proximately caused as a 
result of any defects therein. In the meantime, the owner-
developer greatly benefited because of the enhanced value inuring 
to the lots in the proposed subdivision created by the actual 
installation of said curbs and gutters therein. 
Furthermore, this new claim for so-called "unjust enrich-
ment" was long ago barred by the express provisions of the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act. Any such possible claim necessarily 
arose before May 11, 1979, because it was prior to that date when 
plaintiff-respondent furnished the goods and materials for which 
it sought recovery against defendant-appellant. This being the 
case, plaintiff-respondent was obligated to file a notice of such 
claim before May 11, 1980. Section 63-30-11, U.C.A. 1953, of the 
Utah Governmental Immunity Act, provides in pertinent part as 
follows: 
"Any person having a claim for injury to 
person or property against a governmental 
entity or its employee shall, before main-
taining an action under this act, file a 
written notice of claim with such entity for 
appropriate relief including money damages...." 
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No written notice of its newly asserted claim of "unjust enrich-
ment11 was ever filed. 
As to said claim asserted for the first time in the Second 
Claim for Relief in its Amended Complaint filed July 6, 1983, 
even assuming arguendo that it may have had merit, which defen-
dant-appellant expressly denies, it nevertheless was long ago 
barred by the statute of limitations because it was not filed 
within one year after May 11, 1979, as mandated by the provisions 
of Section 63-30-13, U.C.A. 1953, as amended, providing: 
MA claim against a political subdivision 
is barred unless notice of claim is filed 
with the governing body of the political 
subdivision within one year after the cause 
of action arises.11 
Plaintiff-respondent!s new claim against Salt Lake County 
for so-called "unjust enrichment" falls squarely within the 
general rule set forth in 54 C.J.S., Sec. 281 - Introducing New 
Cause of Action - which provides in pertinent part at page 335: 
"...The general rule is that an amend-
ment which introduces a new or different 
cause of action and makes a new or different 
demand does not relate back to the beginning 
of the action, so as to stop the running of 
the statute of limitations, but is the 
equivalent of a fresh suit on a new cause of 
action, so that the statute continues to run 
until the amendment is filed...." 
In like vein, see 51 Am.Jur. Sec. 218 - Effect of Substantial 
Change - providing in pertinent part at page 776 that: 
"Where an amendment does not merely 
expand or amplify the initially filed plead-
ings, but introduces a new cause of action or 
one which is different and distinct from the 
one originally set up, the new pleading is 
deemed equivalent to the bringing of a new 
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action, and there is no relation back to the 
filing of the original pleading which will 
prevent the statute of limitations from 
running against the new cause of action down 
to the time it is introduced by the amend-
ment. Thus, the statute of limitations will 
bar an amended petition if it does not relate 
back to the original cause of action, but 
constitutes an entirely separate and distinct 
claim and a substantial change therefrom.ff 
The Supreme court of Missouri succinctly reiterated the 
applicable rule of law in the case of McDaniel v. Lovelace, 439 
S.W.2d 906, when it said at page 909: 
"...The general rule is that an amend-
ment will not relate back to the filing of 
the original petition and save a cause of 
action from the bar of the statute of limita-
tions fif proof necessary to support the 
pleading as amended is different from the 
proof necessary to support the same pleading 
before such amendment. . . . ' " 
Point 3. THE LOWER COURT ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT 
THE ACTION OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANT IN 
REGULATING A PROPOSED SUBDIVISION UNDER 
ITS DELEGATED POLICE POWER CONSTITUTED 
THE ENTERING INTO A "PUBLIC CONTRACT" 
WITHIN THE PURVIEW OF TITLE 14, CHAPTER 
1, U.C.A. 1953, SO AS TO MAKE IT LIABLE 
TO PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT FOR NOT REQUIR-
ING A "PAYMENT B0ND,!. 
In granting the Judgment (R. 220), which the lower court 
did, in favor of Concrete Products Company against Salt Lake 
County, the lower court came to the conclusion (which defendant-
appellant respectfully submits is erroneous) that the Agreement 
(copy at R. 4-7, R. 43-45 and R. 138-141), by which the developer 
guaranteed that certain required subdivision improvements would 
be installed, was a "public contract" within the purview of Title 
14, Chapter 1, U.C.A. 1953. This conclusion was buttressed by 
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another conclusion which the lower court made (which defendant-
respondent respectfully submits is likewise erroneous) to the 
effect that lien rights of materialmen were cut off by the action 
which the County took so that accordingly the aforesaid Agreement 
was a ''public contract" within the purview of Title 14, Chapter 
1, U.C.A. 1953. The foregoing analysis and conclusions made by 
the lower court as a basis of its Judgment (R. 220) are set forth 
in its Memorandum Decision of December 13, 1983 (R. 185-189), 
which at R. 187 states in pertinent part: 
"The critical question in this case is 
whether a contract was awarded within the 
meaning of the statute. 
This statute was obviously intended to 
apply primarily to the situation where a 
public body contracts with a construction 
company for the construction or repair of 
public buildings, sewers, sidewalks or the 
like. In this case the County did not con-
tract directly to have the improvements 
constructed. And the County did not pay for 
them; not one cent of public money went to 
construction of the improvements. Rather the 
County required the developer to see to it 
that the improvements were made. The County 
could have required the developer to install 
all of the off-site improvements prior to the 
time that the subdivision was approved. If 
it had done so the materialmen could have 
filed a lien. The statutory scheme is such 
that the protection of the bonding require-
ment should begin its protection where the 
protection of the lien statute ends. In 
other words if Salt Lake County, by accepting 
the subdivision and requiring improvements 
cut off the rights of materialmen to file a 
lien, then the contract requiring the improve-
ments should be construed to be a contract 
award within the meaning of Utah Code Ann., 
Section 14-1-5 and a bond should have been 
required.!f 
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It is recognized that the provision of the Utah Code dealing 
with mechanicfs liens precludes the filing of a mechanic's lien 
which would be effective against public property. In this con-
nection Section 38-1-1, U.C.A. 1953, provides: 
"The provisions of this chapter shall not 
apply to any public building, structure or 
improvement." 
However, the above quoted statutory provision does not mean that 
the lien rights of Concrete Products Company were cut off in the 
case on appeal merely because the concrete materials which 
Concrete Products Company supplied were used for curbs and 
gutters on property dedicated to public use by the owner-developer 
of the Larsen Estates Phase III subdivision. There is simply no 
reason why Concrete Products Company, a division of Gibbons & 
Reed, could not have filed a lien against the Larsen Estates 
Phase III subdivision itself. Such a lien, if properly filed, 
would be effective against the private property within the 
perimeters of the said subdivision. There is no question but 
that the curbs and gutters within the perimeters of the Larsen 
Estates Phase III subdivision benefited all of the lots within 
that subdivision. 
During the argument at the trial of this case, counsel for 
defendant-appellant tried to have the lower court examine some 
certified copies of liens which had in fact been filed for record 
with the County Recorder by G & R Contractor, a division of 
Gibbons and Reed Company, for the concrete curb, gutter and side-
walk which said contractor had installed in another subdivision 
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in Salt Lake County. The reason counsel made such an offer was 
to make it easier for the court to examine the certified copies 
of the liens which already actually were on file in the County 
Recorder's Office rather than have the court examine such docu-
ments as part of the public records on file in the Recorder's 
Office. The liens referred to above were both filed in the 
County Recorder's Office on April 28, 1980, only one year after 
Concrete Products Company, in this case on appeal, furnished the 
concrete materials used in the curbs and gutters in the Larsen 
Estates Phase III subdivision. One of those liens appears as 
Entry No. 3427546 in Book 5093 at Pages 858-860, and the other 
appears as Entry No. 3427547 in Book 5093 at Pages 861-863. 
The lien rights of Concrete Products Company simply were not 
cut off by the action taken by Salt Lake County when it approved 
the Larsen Estates Phase III subdivision. 
CONCLUSION 
A careful analysis of the factual basis for the Judgment 
which the lower court awarded against Salt Lake County, and, the 
proper application of the prevailing law thereto, leads to the 
only justifiable conclusion; namely, that said Judgment should be 
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